This paper studies the role the trading activity plays in the price discovery process of a NYSE-listed stock. We measure the expected information content of each trade by estimating its permanent impact on market quotes. The price impact depends on observable trade features and market conditions. We show that price discovery is quicker after risky trades and at the extreme intervals of the session. The quote adjustment to trade-related shocks is progressive and this causes risk persistency and unusual short-term market conditions following risky trades.
Introduction
A central notion of microstructure literature is that trades are informative. Accordingly, theoretical research characterizes the stochastic process of prices as a function of the trading process. Market participants learn from the sequence of trades, updating their beliefs, and this causes prices to move. Since the stochastic process of prices underlies most of the topics studied in financial economics, it becomes fundamental to understand this learning mechanism. In this paper, we analyze the learning process of a NYSE listed stock, that is, we measure the information content of its trades and evaluate how i s it reflected in the market quotes. Our main concern is to describe the dynamics of the price discovery process after a trade conditional on its information asymmetry risk. We study how long market participants take to learn from trades, when the price discovery is faster, how it depends on the expected risk of the trade and how it affects the traders behavior and the market conditions. Every feature of the trading process correlated with the value of the asset may provide information to market participants. For example, in Easley and O'Hara (1987) is the trade size that provides information, but in Easley and O'Hara (1992) is the timing of trades. From an empirical perspective, there is no consensus about what actually drives the relation between the trading activity and the process of price formation. Thus, Jones et al. (1994) conclude that the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size, contains all the information relevant to the pricing of securities. However, Huang and Masulis (1999) and Chan and Fong (2000) conclude that trade size contains no trivial information. Similarly, Dufour and Engle (2000) report that both the trade duration and the trade size are informative. These contradictory findings suggest that traders do learn from the complex interaction of several trade features.
A closely related research is the estimation of the theoretical components of the bid-ask spread. The adverse selection costs (Bagehot, 1971) are usually characterized as the permanent impact that a trade-related shock produces on the equilibrium value of the stock.
Current methods usually build on structural models with an exogenous trading process characterized just by the trade sign (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1997) or the trade size (e.g., Glosten and Harris, 1988) . A reduced form approach is introduced by Hasbrouck (1991a,b) where the permanent impact of a trade can be estimated through the impulse-response function (IRF) of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model for quotes and trades. In the context of an order-driven market, de Jong et al. (1996) study the price effects of trading using two alternative approaches, the Glosten (1994) model and the VAR model. Once again, the information content of trades is characterized only by the trade size. They show that the estimates of the average adverse selection costs based on the Hasbrouck's model are twice as large of those of the structural model. The reason for the different price effects estimates is that structural models assume that prices immediately disseminate all the information conveyed by a trade. On the contrary, the VAR model accounts for the dynamic impact of trades. If the quote adjustment to trade-related shocks is progressive, informed traders would try to profit from the transitory erroneous pricing. This might cause persistency in the information-asymmetry risk and unusual short-term market conditions.
In this paper, we measure the expected information content of each IBM trade performed at the NYSE during the first semester of 1996 using the IRF of a generalization of the Hasbrouck's VAR model. A methodological innovation is that the information risk of a particular trade is a function of several observable trade features and market conditions acting simultaneously, allowing for a more accurate characterization of the price impact than in previous studies. Our approach takes into account the dynamic impacts on both the market quotes and the trading process, and we will evidence that these effects represent a nonnegligible part of the total impact of a trade. Huang and Stoll (1996) also address the tradespecific estimation of adverse selection costs. Using a non-parametric procedure, they compute the price impact over a time horizon "long enough" as to allow all the information conveyed by the trade to be incorporated into prices. However, this time horizon is arbitrary and independent of the trade features. On the contrary, our procedure provides an estimation of the time (in number of events) that quotes need to take in all the information content of a particular trade. We evidence that this period depends on the trade features, the market environment and the moment of the session.
We use these instruments to analyze how IBM traders learn from the trading process. Our main empirical findings are the following. First, the market accelerates after risky trades. We show that trading frequency augments following trades with a high expected risk, perhaps due to competition between informed traders (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, and Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1 992) . Indeed, quote alignments after trades are progressive rather than instantaneous and this fact originates sequences of trades with a similar (but decreasing) information-asymmetry risk. This apparent competition quickens the dissemination of the new t rade-inferred information. Consequently, price discovery improves after risky trades.
Second, it is evidenced that quotes adjust faster to the new information inferred from trades during the opening and closing hours of the trading session. Third, in accordance with the short-term persistency in the information-asymmetry risk, we observe short-term anomalies in the market conditions after risky trades. Volatility and trading activity both increase and liquidity decreases with the estimated long-term impact of trades.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model. Section 3 describes the data, discusses some methodological details and shows preliminary estimation results. Section 4 analyzes the intra-daily distribution of adverse selection costs and measures the relative importance of the adverse selection costs component of the bid-ask spread.
Section 5 evidences short-term persistency in the information-asymmetry risk after trades.
Section 6 examines the speed of adjustment of market quotes to a trade-related shock. Section 7 studies the short-term market reaction to risky trades. Finally, section 8 concludes.
The information content of trades
The permanent impact of the unexpected component of a trade on the equilibrium value of the stock is an appropriate measure of its information-asymmetry risk. To see this, let m t be the efficient price, understood as the expected true value of the stock in some future end-oftrading time conditional on the public information available at moment t ( t Φ ). Microstructure structural models ( e.g., Madhavan et al., 1997, and Stoll, 1997) build on similar structures to estimate the parameter α from observable quote and trade data.
However, these methods end up with an estimation of the average adverse selection costs for all trades in the sample. For our purposes, we require a procedure to estimate the informationasymmetry risk of each particular trade, say α t .
Under the hypothesis that the public information set is exclusively given by the past evolution of trades and quotes, Hasbrouck (1991a,b) introduces an econometric methodology to model the dynamic relationship between the trading process and the subsequent adjustment of market quotes. This methodology is based on a general VAR model for the changes of the quote midpoint and the trade indicator x t previously defined. Following Dufour and Engle (2000) , in this paper we use a generalization of the Hasbrouck (1991a) model given by,
The revision in market quotes ∆q t = (q t -q t-1 ) represents the change in the quote midpoint after a trade in period t (x t ). The terms v 1,t and v 2,t are the formerly introduced zero-mean mutually and serially uncorrelated stochastic processes. We assume that the market participants learn from the trade features and their environment. Therefore, the impact of a trade depends on a set of exogenous variables included in t he vector MC t that characterizes the trade and the market conditions. Microstructure theory suggests several indicators that may be correlated with the value of the asset. Easley and O'Hara (1987) , among others, suggest that large-sized trades may hide impatient traders with a perishable information advantage. Hasbrouck (1991a) and de Jong et al. (1996) evidence the relevance of the trade size in the VAR methodology. Easley and O'Hara (1992) propose a model in which less time between consecutive trades (trade duration) is an indicator of new information arriving at the market. Dufour and Engle (2000) test the predictions of Easley and O'Hara's model using the VAR methodology. Copeland and Galai (1983) , and French and Roll (1986) , among others, manifest the relevance of price volatility in determining liquidity in general and market quotes in particular. We introduce volatility in the VAR model as a determinant of the trade risk.
Finally, it is known that adverse selection costs and liquidity are negatively related (e.g., Kyle, 1985) . Following Lee et al. (1993) , in this paper liquidity is measured by both immediacy costs and depth. All these variables interact with the trade indicator to determine the long-run impact of a particular trade. Thus, the estimated impact of a large-sized trade will depend on the quoted spread, the market depth, the price volatility, the trade duration, and so on. Vectors The VAR methodology turns out to be more flexible than the methods based on structural models. First, the trading process is not exogenous. This feature is relevant as far as a traderelated shock might cause posterior effects (we show it does) on the trading process. If these dynamic effects were due to the same informative event, the initial impact would be just one part of the long-term impact of a trade-related shock. Second, if the information provided by a trade is not instantaneously incorporated into prices (we show it is not), the trade might also have lagged effects on quotes (we show it has). The structure in (1) accommodates these dynamic effects on both the trading process and the market quotes.
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The VAR model captures, as special cases, the main dynamics behind the structural models of quote formation. Indeed, the impulse-response function (IRF) of the VAR model (e.g., Sims, 1980) is an appropriate estimator of the parameter α, that is, an accurate measure of the long-term impact of an unexpected shock in the trading process (see Hasbrouck, 1991a) . In this paper, we use the IRF associated to the VAR model (1) as a proxy for the adverse selection costs associated to each trade ( α t ). This IRF is conditional on the market situation and the trade features and, therefore, trade-specific. The next section describes the database, provides the details of the derivation and implementation of the IRF, and describes the methodology used to measure the trade-specific information-asymmetry risk.
Data and model estimation
The VAR model (1) is estimated for IBM using trade and quote data from the TAQ database of the NYSE. All the trading days from January to June 1996 are considered. IBM was one of the most frequently traded stocks during this period. This guarantees a number of observations large enough to perform the posterior empirical analysis. We only keep trades and quotes from the primary market (NYSE). Trades not codified as "regular trades" are discarded. These are trades cancelled or corrected due to error and trades out of sequence.
Non-regular trades represent less than the 0.1% of the entire sample. Trades with the same price and time stamp are treated as just one trade. All quote and trade registers before the opening or after the close are dropped. The overnight changes in quotes are treated as missing values. Quotes with bid-ask spreads lower than or equal to zero or quoted depth equal to zero have also been eliminated. Price and quote files are coupled using the so-called "five seconds rule" (see Lee and Ready, 1991) . This rule assigns to each trade the first quote stamped at least five seconds before the trade itself.
Following previous empirical studies, a trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated when the price is closer to the ask (bid) price than to the bid (ask) price. Henceforth, the first ones are called "buys" and the second ones are called "sells". The trade indicator x t equals 1 for buys, -1 for sells, and 0 for trades with execution price equal to the quote midpoint. A change in quotes is computed as the difference between the quotes that correspond to the trade at t+1 and to the trade at t, ∆q t =(q t -q t-1 ) . Eight trading-time dummies are constructed: one for the first half-hour of trading, five for each trading hour between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. and, finally, the last trading hour has been divided in two half-hour intervals. This procedure isolates the opening and closing periods of the session. . ' Hasbrouck, 1991a; Dufour and Engle, 2000) and are consistent with the predictions of adverse selection costs models. A large-sized trade, executed a few seconds after the previous trade, within an illiquid and price-volatile period has a larger expected impact on quotes. The initial impact is statistically significant for all exogenous variables (interacting with the trade indicator). Lagged effects are especially relevant for trade-size, immediacy costs and trade durations. The trade equation shows the strong positive autocorrelation of signed trades already evidenced by Hasbrouck (1991a) . In conclusion, a shock in the trading process will produce an instantaneous but also posterior dynamic adjustments on both the trading activity and the market quotes. This implies progressive rather than immediate adjustments to trade-related shocks.
[ Table I ]
The VMA representation of (3) To compute the adverse selection costs that correspond to a given trade (ASC t ), we first locate the step τ t of the simulation that reaches the 99% of the total estimated impact. Notice that the variable τ t will be an estimator of the time (in number of trades) required for prices to reflect all the information carried by the trade. The accumulated impact at this point is our estimation of the adverse selection costs for a particular trade. We have also considered t he 50%, 75% and 90% of the total estimated impact to define ASC t . 
Preliminary findings
4.1. The intra-daily distribution of adverse selection costs Wei (1992) , Viswanathan (1990, 1993) , and Madhavan et al. (1997) suggest that adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed throughout t he day. This costs decrease towards the end of the session, together with an increase in inventory holding costs (see Madhavan et al., 1997) . This finding would be consistent with a higher concentration of information-motivated versus liquidity-motivated t raders during the initial intervals of the trading session. We check this hypothesis using ASC t .
[ Figure 1 ] Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of the IBM trades by trading interval and adverse selection costs level, measured by ASC t . We divide the session in thirteen half-hour intervals.
Bands of the same color represent the percentage of trades belonging to ASC(j), j={1,...,5}, executed in each interval (the thirteen bands of the same color sum to the 100%). The column height is the sum of all five percentages per interval. The distribution of the trading activity exhibits the usual U -shaped pattern. The trades with the highest expected adverse selection costs, ASC(4) and ASC (5), are concentrated at the extremities of the session. The 47.62% of all trades belonging to ASC(5) were performed during the opening (36.37%) and closing (11.25%) half-hours. Similarly, the 31.66% of all trades classified as ASC (4) were accomplished during the opening and closing half-hours, and the 18.32% only during the first half-hour. In contrast, ASC(1) trades are detected mainly in the middle of the session and only the 2.99% in the first half-hour of trading. Previous results manifest that the risk of trading with an informed agent is the highest during the opening interval of each session. The ASC (5) and ASC (4) 
The relevance of adverse selection costs in a dynamic context
Using data from the Paris Bourse, de Jong et al. (1996) estimate the adverse selection costs component of the bid-ask spread using two alternative approaches, a structural model based on Glosten (1994) and the Hasbrouck's VAR model. These authors assume that only the trade size provides information to the market participants and, hence, the permanent price impact of trades depends only on this feature. They show that the estimates of the average adverse selection costs based on the Hasbrouck's model are twice as large of those of the structural model. The explanation is that the Glosten's model assumes that prices immediately disseminate all the information conveyed by a trade and, therefore, it ignores the lagged price effects. Indeed, this is a common feature of adverse selection costs models (e.g., Glosten and Harris, 1988; Madhavan et al., 1997, and Stoll, 1997) . In this section, we extend this analysis by using a more complete characterization of the price impact (ASC t ), comparing the results for trades with different risk levels, controlling for the intra-daily regularities shown in previous subsection and using NYSE data.
We use Lin et al. (1995) methodology as the theoretical point of reference. 4 Equation (4) summarizes this method,
where P t represents the execution price of the trade, e t is the error term and (4) by OLS robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Newey and West, 1987) . We obtain that the average adverse selection costs represent the δ =26.3% of the effective spread.
The first column of coefficients in Table II shows the result of estimating equation (5), a generalization of (4) [
[ Table II ] Table II shows that the percentage of total immediacy costs due to adverse selection costs significantly augments with ASC(j), from the 15,97% for ASC(1) trades to the 29,95% for ASC(5) trades. Moreover, the trades executed during the first half-hour of trading have a 2,55% risk premium. The second column of coefficients in Table II contains the estimation of (5) but replacing the dependent variable ∆q t with the initial impact of the trade obtained by the simulation of the VAR model (3). The percentages are much the same as those obtained with the observed data but, in this case, the trades accomplished during the final interval of the session also have a risk premium. We can conclude that, if only the initial impact of the trade is considered, adverse selection costs represent, in average terms, no more than the 30-32% of the effective spread. However, the conclusion changes when the dynamic effects of trades are taken into consideration. As in de Jong et al. (1996) , we compute the absolute ratio of the corresponding ASC t value to the half-effective spread,
The median simulated total price impact represents the 80% for ASC(3) trades, the 90% for ASC(4) trades and more than the 100% for ASC(5) trades. This result is consistent with de Jong et al. (1996) finding that large trades of the Paris Bourse have a permanent price impact larger than the quoted bid-ask spread. This finding manifests that adverse selection costs in a dynamic framework are far more important than the one period structural models would suggest. The quoted spread for a frequently traded stock (most of the time equal to the tick, US$ 1/8 in 1996) may not compensate the costs of providing liquidity to trades with a high risk. This result reflects two very reasonable facts. First, informed traders prefer to trade when the stock is liquid. Second, the specialist duty of maintaining stable liquidity conditions forces him/her to offer spreads that could be insufficient to compensate high-risk levels. These losses, however, would be compensated with the liquidity-motivated traders.
Risk persistency
Previous sections have shown the relevance of the dynamic impacts of trade-related shocks on both the quotes and the trading process. Therefore, the information content of a trade is not instantaneously incorporated into prices, suggesting that market participants take some intervals of trading to have their expectational differences resolved (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993) . Under these circumstances, it would be reasonable to find additional trades taking profits from the temporal divergence between market quotes and the efficient price. We should expect sequences of trades with similar (but decreasing) values of ASC t . This section studies this expected short-run persistency in the information-asymmetry risk by modeling the time series of ASC t .
The usual unit-root tests (extended Dickey and Fuller, 1979, and Phillips and Perron, 1988) show that the ASC t time series is a I(0) process. Moreover, the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions indicate that ASC t can be modeled as an autoregressive process of finite order (AR(p)), with p at least equal to 3. Both the information inferred from the trading process and the possible transitory deviation between the efficient price and q t are expected to increase with ASC(j), j={1,...,5}. Thus, our intuition is that the magnitude of the autoregressive coefficients of the AR(p) model should also increase with the estimated ASC t .
We proceed with the estimation of the truncated AR(5) model (6) for the time series of ASC t using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method. The dummies Q t j , j={1,...,5}, were introduced in section 4.2. These dummy variables define five thresholds in the autoregressive structure of ASC t . The variable u t is the error term of the model. 
[ Table III] Table III reveals significant differences in the autocorrelation structure of the time series ASC t across the five levels of adverse selection costs considered. Using the Wald test (e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) we reject (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis that the sums of the autoregressive coefficients corresponding to each pair ASC(j) and ASC(k), with j ≠k, are equal. Indeed, the sum of the autoregressive coefficients increases with ASC(j), j={1,...5}.
This means that trades with an elevated information-asymmetry risk (large ASC t value) are more likely followed by similar trades than those with low information-asymmetry risk (low ASC t value). These clusters of trades with similar risk suggest competition between informed traders. Informed traders try to maximize their gains exploiting the temporal disagreement between the quoted prices and the efficient price. Table III reveals that the informationasymmetry risk persists after the execution of a risky trade because of the gradual adjustment of market quotes. This short-term risk persistency does augments with the adverse selection costs associated to the trade at time t.
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We have considered an alternative specification for (6) that uses the trade-time dummy variables D t instead of the Q t ones to truncate the AR(5) structure. This specification would capture differences in the AR(5) coefficients per trading hour. The statistical tests performed do not reject the null hypothesis of an equal AR(5) structure across trading hours. Therefore, we conclude that the results in Table III do are due to differences in adverse selection costs and are not biased by any intra-daily regular pattern.
Price discovery and the information content of trades
The simulation procedure of the VAR model (3) produces an additional output to the tradespecific adverse selection costs measure ( ASC t ). This output is an estimation of the time (in number of events) that quotes require to disseminate all the information content in a particular trade, say τ t . We have transformed it into real time using the distance in seconds between the time stamp of the simulated trade and the time stamp of the τ t th trade afterwards. We denote by D(τ) t to the series formed by the real-time distances obtained for all trades. In this section, we evaluate how long market participants take to learn from trades by studying whether this time of adjustment depends on the market conditions and the characteristics of trades (MC t ).
That is, we check how the price discovery process depends on each trade's expected risk. 
For simplicity, we assume linearity in the specification. In order to control for the regular patterns in trading frequency, we include the dummy variables h t D (with 12:00-13:00 as the control interval).
[ Table IV] As expected, the duration of the learning process depends on the moment of execution.
During the less frequently traded hours (between 12:00 and 14:00), the period of quote adjustment could go on around 12 minutes (δ o /60). However, if the trade is executed during the first half-hour of the trading session, this time is reduced to 7.5 minutes ((δ o +γ 1 )/60), approximately. Moreover, Table IV reveals that the adjustment period shortens with trade size and price volatility. On the contrary, it lengthens with liquidity and the trade duration.
Collectively, the higher the expected adverse selection costs, the shorter the adjustment period. If we replace MC t in equation (7) by the ASC t estimator, we end up with the same conclusion.
We hypothesize that this last finding is due to an increase in the trading intensity following trades with high information-asymmetry risk. This effect accelerates the process of price discovery. The increase in the trading intensity may reflect the sequential reaction of the market to the same informative signal, an imitative behavior by other agents in the market, or even order-splitting by the same agent (see Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Biais et al., 1995, and He and Wang, 1995) . As the results in the previous section suggested, the temporal disagreement between quoted prices and the efficient price may induce competition between informed traders. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Easley and O'Hara (1992) , and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) develop alternative models in which competition between informed traders favors price efficiency, especially if their activity is based on the same informative signal. Consistently, our results imply that prices respond more quickly after a trade when its estimated risk increases. Additionally, price discovery is faster during the periods where the risky trading concentrates. The next section provides additional evidence supporting our hypothesis of "market acceleration" after an informative trade. Huang and Stoll (1996) measured the impact of a trade at time t by (q t+τ* -q t )x t , where q t+τ* is the quote midpoint associated to the first trade executed (at least) τ* minutes l ater. The value of τ* is the same for all trades and arbitrarily fixed. Huang and Stoll use this measure to compare the adverse selection costs of a matched sample of NYSE and Nasdaq listed stocks.
The evidence in this section indicates that the results of Huang and Stoll may be biased because the value of τ* depends on the moment of execution, the concrete characteristics of the trade, and the market conditions. Moreover, the value of τ t for a given trade might differ under different microstructures. The d ifference between our adverse selection costs measure and the effective spread could be seen as an ex-ante and more flexible version of the Huang and Stoll's realized spread.
The short-term market response to risky trades
This section studies the market impact of both the progressive adjustment of market quotes and the associated risk persistency reported in previous sections. We analyze how the market behavior following a trade depends on its expected information-asymmetry risk. There is by now a large literature about unusual market patterns around localized informative events (e.g., Lee et al., 1993; Koski and Michaely, 2000, and Goldstein and Kavajezc, 2000) . Unusual patterns generally consist on increased trading activity, volatility and illiquidity both before and after the event. Pre-event behavior is attributed to informed traders that anticipate the informative shock. Post-event behavior is more difficult to interpret. If the public disclosure resolves the information asymmetry, the market should return to its non-event behavior. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) develop a model in which certain traders are able to make superior judgments from public disclosures than others. This situation increases the information asymmetry after the event and produces less liquidity and the possibility of more trading activity and volatility (see also Harris and Raviv, 1993) .
Event studies compare the periods surrounding the events under analysis with a benchmark that is not influenced by such (or other) informative events. Such a methodology is not workable in our case because our events (trades) are not isolated from other similar events.
We have reported short-term persistency in the information-asymmetry risk caused by clusters of trades that can be differentiated by i ts average level of adverse selection costs. We understand that clusters of trades with a similar ASC(j) level can be associated to the same event. Hence, to avoid possible biases in posterior tests, we proceed by filtering the sample.
When we observe a sequence of buys or sells that are very close one to the others and with the same ASC(j) level, only the first trade of the sequence is included in the subsequent tests. 6 Furthermore, results in Table IV 
We have shown that adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed throughout the trading session. Moreover, activity, liquidity and volatility indicators also show intra-daily regular patterns (e.g., Jain and Joh, 1988, and McInish and Wood, 1992) . In equation (8) Table B .I evidences that immediacy costs are increasing in adverse selection costs. For some trading intervals, these differences persist during the 15 minutes analyzed. Figure 2 shows the average bid-ask spread weighted by time (not standardized) for each ASC(j) level, j={1,…,5}, during the 15 minutes interval. Differences fade away 6 or 7 minutes after the trade. Table B.II shows similar statistically significant differences in volatility. It increases with ASC(j), implying t hat trades with greater adverse selection costs tend to increment the uncertainty about the true value of the stock. Regarding the quoted depth (not reported), the ASC (5) (ASC(1)) trades are located in periods of higher (lower) depth than the other trades. However, there is not a monotonic increasing relationship between the quoted depth and ASC(j). After the trade, the quoted depth tends to increase with less intensity (or even decrease) as the trade risk augments. Results, in any case, are not conclusive.
[ Figure 2] Tables B.III-B.IV report an unusually intense trading activity going after risky trades.
Supporting our "market acceleration" hypothesis, trades with a high expected risk lead to an increase in trading intensity, probably due to the successive reaction of the market to the new information and to the competition between traders. Hence, the wider quoted spreads may be the result of the combination of a "liquidity consumption effect" caused by the increase in trading activity and a greater protectionism by liquidity providers facing an increase in the risk of informed trading. In an attempt to judge the relevance of the liquidity consumption effect in explaining unusual spreads and volatility, we have also estimated equation (9) 
We obtain that the differences in immediacy costs are not completely explained by a liquidity consumption effect. Indeed, the bid-ask spread and the volatility, once corrected by trading activity, still increase with the adverse selection costs level (ASC(j), j={1,…,5}). Results (available upon requests) are similar to those detailed in Tables B.I and B.II. Globally, these findings suggest that market participants learn from the observable features of the trade and the market. Then, they revise their positions altering (at least) the liquidity of the stock and the intensity of trading. These unusual market conditions keep on due to the short-term persistency of the information-asymmetry risk. It is important to remark that this behavior is independent of the moment of the session.
Conclusions
This paper has described how market participants learn from the trading process and incorporate the trade-related information into the stochastic process of prices. We focused on the price discovery process of IBM, a NYSE-listed stock. Our main concern has been to evaluate the dynamics of the price discovery process after a trade conditional on its information-asymmetry risk. To do that, we evaluated the risk of each IBM trade in the sample by estimating its expected permanent price impact. A remarkable methodological innovation is that the price impact depends on the simultaneous incidence of several characteristics of the trade and the market. This allowed for a more precise characterization of adverse selection costs than in previous studies that typically identify the information content of trades with their size. The estimator is based on the impulse-response function of a VAR model estimated with all trades performed one month before the corresponding trade.
Therefore, it is trade-specific. Furthermore, as pointed out by Hasbrouck (1996) and de Jong et al. (1996) , the reduced form approach of the VAR model accurately characterizes the total impact of a trade by t aking into account the posterior effects of trades on both the market quotes and the trading process itself. Finally, a further output is a trade-specific estimation of the time that quotes take to disseminate the information content of each trade-related shock.
Our empirical findings show that the price discovery process accelerates after risky trades.
Trading frequency augments following trades with an expected high informational content.
Presumably, this is due to the competition between informed traders. Additionally, the progressive alignment of the quotes after a trade originates clusters of trades with a similar (but decreasing) information-asymmetry risk and, consequently, short-term risk persistency.
At the same time, this causes short-term anomalies in market conditions that augment with the trade risk. We also report that quotes adjust faster during the opening and closing hours of the session, where the risky trading concentrates.
Footnotes
1. The VAR model has also some important drawbacks from an econometric point of view. The homokedasticity assumption in the distribution of v 1,t and v 2,t seems to be restrictive given the vast evidence about intra-daily deterministic patterns in volatility. In any case, defining the model in trade-time should mitigate the effect of a latent heteroskedasticity. Hasbrouck (1999) introduces a model for ask and bid quotes in which the innovations in the efficient price are generated by an EGARCH model. Hausman et al. (1992) analyze changes in prices using an ordered probit model, without forcing homoskedasticity. However, in these models the trading process is endogenous. In addition, Escribano and Pascual (2000) show that there is an important loss of information in averaging the quote behavior through the quote midpoint. These authors propose a vector error correction model (VEC) for ask and bid prices, with the bid-ask spread as the error correction term, that generalizes the VAR model. Hasbrouck (1991a,b) , Hasbrouck (1993 ), de Jong et al. (1996 , Hasbrouck (1996) , and Dufour and Engle (2000) , among others, discuss other controversial aspects related to the estimation of the VAR model.
2. An anonymous referee suggested that asymmetric depth could be more correlated with adverse selection costs than the average depth. Unfortunately, the VAR model cannot accommodate this variable because: (1) The trading process is summarized using a unique trade indicator (x t ). (2) All exogenous variables enter into the model interacting with x t . (3) All theories predict that asymmetric depth will have opposite effects on buyerinitiated and seller-initiated trades. Adverse selection costs, inventory control and barrier theories about asymmetric depth are discussed in Huang and Stoll (1994) and Engle and Patton (2000) . It is easy to check that, independently of the proxy used, the VAR model is not useful to determine which one of these competing theories is the appropriate theoretical framework. We would need a model with two indicators, one for buyer initiated and another for seller initiated trades to incorporate asymmetric depth into the analysis (for example, see Escribano and Pascual, 2000) .
3. Although GARCH-family models have been widely applied to financial time series, there are few examples of GARCH models applied to not equally spaced time series (e.g., Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994) . For this reason, we have repeated the analysis with other volatility measures. These alternative volatility proxies are constructed using the quote midpoint changes observed during a given time interval (from 1 to 5 minutes) before the time stamp of each trade. The absolute total change, the accumulated absolute and squared changes and the difference between the maximum and the minimum values of the quote midpoint during each interval are some of the measures considered. In general, the VAR estimations are consistent across proxies and the main conclusions unaltered.
4. We choose Lin et al. (1995) because it is one of the most used models in practice (e.g., Brockman and Chung, 1999) . Moreover, this method does not require the estimation of dynamic equations; so, our estimation results will be less affected by the trades removed (see section 3). Finally, the parametric simplicity of the Lin et al. (1995) facilitates extensions directed to control for several factors. Although Huang and Stoll (1997) is probably the most general model, its main advantage is to distinguish between inventory holding and operative costs. Our interest, however, is focused on adverse selection costs only.
5. Risk persistency could also be evaluated by applying the extended Dickey-Fuller unit roots test to each threshold in (6). However, the t-statistics of such a test are neither standard nor currently tabulated. It should be necessary to obtain the critic values by simulation, something that is out of the scope of this paper.
6. We compute the median (in seconds) between two consecutive trades belonging to the same ASC(j) level, with j={1,...,5}. These medians are 30 for ASC(1) trades, 24 for ASC(2) and ASC(3) trades, 17 for ASC(4) trades and 13 for ASC (5) trades. If the time between to consecutive trades of the same type is less than the corresponding median, these trades are considered as originated by the same informative event. The analysis has been repeated using other filters and even using all trades in the sample. The main findings are consistent.
7. The standardization method is robust to outliers. For example, consider the observation that corresponds to the accumulated volume during the fifth minute after a trade time-stamped at 9:58:00 ( (5) (7) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987) . The variable τt is an estimation of the time (in number of events) that quotes need to capture all the information provided by a given trade. This τt comes from the simulation of the VAR model (3) and is trade-specific. D(τ)t is the series formed with all τt expressed in real time (seconds). Vt = trade size (in number of shares). Tt = time (in seconds) since the preceding trade. St = bid-ask spread. QDt = quoted depth (average between depth at the ask and depth at the bid prices). Rt = volatility (implicit volatility of ∆qt estimated with a GARCH (1,1) (5) ASC (4) ASC (3) ASC (2) ASC(1)
FIGURE 2
Bid-ask spread dynamics after a trade conditional on adverse selection costs This figure shows the average bid-ask spread weighted by time (not standardized) for each information-asymmetry risk level (ASC(j), j={1,…,5}) during the 15 minutes after a trade. t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+6  t+7  t+8  t+9  t+10  t+11  t+12  t+13  t+14  t+15 Time (minutes)
APPENDIX A The impulse-response function
To perform the simulation of the VAR model (3) we need to define a generating process for MC t ' = (V t , T t , S t , QD t , R t ). It is assumed that each component of MC t follows a general probabilistic process, exogenous to the model (3). This process is approximated by a linear autoregressive model AR(p k ) like (A.1), where p k , k={1,...,5}, must be determined empirically. Model (A.1) is estimated by GLS. Dummy variables are included to control for the deterministic intra-daily components.
Once (2)- (3) and (A.1) have been estimated, t he simulation procedure for each of the IBM trades proceeds as follows:
Step #1: Use (A.1), k={1,...,5}, to predict the future values of MC t needed to proceed with the simulation of (3). Assume that ) , (
, where k µ and 2 k σ are estimated through the mean and variance of the GLS residuals of (A.1). The initial conditions
..,p k and ∀ k, correspond to the values associated to the p k trades that precede the one simulated.
Step #2: Obtain the impulse-response function (IRF) of (3), n periods into the future, using Step #3: Repeat steps #1 and #2 10.000 times. The 10.000 estimated conditional values for each step n j (j=1,...,n) of the IRF are averaged to obtain the final IRF of the trade, 
